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STATUTORY REFORM OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS: THE AMERICAN 
EXPERIENCE AND THE ROLE OF THE BAR 
RONALD M. LEVIN*
In 2004, the Japanese government was completing a restructuring of 
its judicial review system and was looking forward to a follow-up round of 
legislative activity to reform its administrative procedures. I was asked to 
speak to the Japan American Society for Legal Studies about the American 
experience with administrative law reform at the congressional level. In 
particular, I was asked to discuss the role that administrative lawyers 
have played in these legislative deliberations. The result was the following 
presentation, which has been slightly edited for American publication. I 
hope it will appeal to American readers who may be interested in a quick 
overview of regulatory reform debates in Congress over the past sixty 
years. 
INTRODUCTION 
I am pleased to have this opportunity to speak to you about statutory 
reform of the administrative process—a topic that has interested me from 
the earliest days of my academic career, as I will explain. In this talk, I 
will try to highlight the role that administrative lawyers have played in 
promoting, or sometimes resisting, legislative changes. I will also try to 
analyze why some reform efforts have succeeded and others have failed. 
Before I get into details, let me articulate two broad reasons why an 
administrative reform effort may be unsuccessful. The first is that it may 
be too ambitious. To appreciate this possibility, think about some of the 
reasons why an overly ambitious effort may be launched in the first place. 
Remember that the American system of separated powers of government 
is very different from a parliamentary system such as Japan’s. Either or 
both of the Houses of Congress can be controlled by a party that is 
different from the President’s party. Moreover, even when the same party 
 1. Henry Hitchcock Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis. I am grateful for the 
assistance of Professors Takehisa Nakagawa and Setsuo Hiyama in making the arrangements for my 
presentation to the (JASLS) and related events. I was particularly gratified to have the opportunity to 
appear on a program together with my sometime translator, Professor Takayoshi Tsuneoka. See 
ERNEST GELLHORN & RONALD M. LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL (3d 
ed. 1990), published in translation as GENDAI AMERIKA GYOSEI HO (Keikichi Ohama & Takayoshi 
Tsuneoka trans., 1996). 
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controls Congress and the White House, legislative leaders often pursue an 
agenda that is different from the President’s agenda. Indeed, an energetic 
group of legislators can actively promote a bill, and sometimes succeed in 
getting it enacted, without the support of their own party leaders. 
In the administrative law field, disagreements within the government 
about proposed legislation can be intensified by the fact that the executive 
branch is usually the actual target of the measures being considered. Thus, 
arguments about administrative law reform may reflect philosophical 
differences, but they also are often fueled by the eternal competition for 
power between the executive and legislative branches. Proposals in 
Congress that have a distinctly anti-agency flavor can often gain quite a bit 
of momentum, notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of the executive 
branch. In general, however, when an administrative reform movement is 
perceived as making a fundamental assault on agencies’ effectiveness, it 
triggers strong defensive moves by supporters of regulation, resulting in 
stalemate. 
The second major reason why an administrative reform may fail is that 
it can be regarded as unnecessary. As a matter of fact, statutory reform of 
administrative law in our system is a fairly rare phenomenon. In saying 
this, I do not at all mean to say that our regulatory system has been static. 
On the contrary, it has undergone dramatic evolution in a number of 
respects in recent decades. What I do mean to say is that much, probably 
most, of this evolution has occurred through nonstatutory means, including 
decisions reached by the courts, executive orders issued by the President, 
and regulations and guidelines developed by agencies themselves. 
Legislative action is difficult to obtain in our country, and reformers often 
view it as a last resort. In short, the question of whether Congress should 
legislate is often not a question of whether change should occur at all, but 
instead a question of whether statutory action is needed as a vehicle for 
reform. 
With these observations in the background, I will offer you a quick 
historical tour of statutory reform of American administrative law in the 
modern era. For purposes of exposition, I will divide my narrative into 
four phases: 
— The first phase, which I will call the Era of Codification, is the 
period that culminated in the enactment of our Administrative Procedure 
Act2 (APA) in 1946. The APA approximately corresponds to the Japanese 
 2. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–06, 1305, 
3105, 3344, 5372, 7521 (2000)). 
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Administrative Procedures Law3 and Administrative Case Litigation4 Law 
combined. 
— The second phase, which I will call the Era of Consolidation, began 
in the late 1940s and lasted for about two decades. This was a period in 
which administrative lawyers gradually became reconciled to the limited 
nature of what the APA had accomplished. 
— The third phase, which I will call the Era of Adaptation, extended 
through roughly the 1960s and 1970s. During this period, administrative 
lawyers and Congress worked in partnership on a variety of reform 
measures, recognizing that new challenges in the regulatory state called 
for elaboration and alterations in the APA framework. 
— Finally, the fourth phase, which I will call the Era of 
Disillusionment, began around 1980 and has lasted until the present day. 
The most prominent reform activities during this period have been led by 
business interests and their political allies. These movements have been 
driven by an underlying mood of disenchantment with the progressive 
approach to regulation that prevailed during the earlier periods. The 
administrative law bar has largely resisted these reform initiatives, 
although it has also worked constructively with Congress on forward-
looking enactments in specialized areas. 
These neat chronological divisions are imperfect. There was, in fact, a 
good deal of overlap among the four eras. I will try to explain the 
limitations of the model during my exposition. But still, the trajectory of 
developing attitudes has conformed fairly well to the transitions I have just 
described, and this simplified model will provide a vehicle that will enable 
me to tell a coherent story. As I have hinted, administrative lawyers have 
had their greatest success in promoting statutory reform during the third 
phase. 
THE ERA OF CODIFICATION 
I will turn first to the Era of Codification. As I mentioned, the defining 
feature of this period was the protracted legislative struggle that led to 
adoption of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946.5 In the 1930s, 
Congress created a number of new administrative agencies to address the 
hardships of the Great Depression. In doing so, Congress was following 
 3. Gyosei tetsuzuki ho [Administrative Procedures Law], Law No. 88 of 1993.
 4. Gyosei jiken sosho ho [Administrative Case Litigation Law], Law No. 139 of 1962. 
 5. The following account draws heavily on George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The 
Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557 (1996). 
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the leadership of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, whose progressive 
political platform had come to be known as the New Deal. During the 
early Roosevelt years, conservative business interests that felt threatened 
by New Deal programs assumed, with good reason, that they would be 
shielded by the conservatively minded courts. In 1937, however, decisions 
of the Supreme Court signaled that it would not invoke the Constitution to 
invalidate the New Deal in its entirety.6 Accordingly, business interests 
turned to Congress. 
At that time, the American Bar Association strongly supported the 
conservatives’ effort to rein in New Deal agencies. The ABA had 
appointed a deeply conservative Special Committee on Administrative 
Law. Its members viewed the agencies with great suspicion. One reason 
was that those agencies threatened the material interests of their corporate 
clients. Another reason was that the procedures of these agencies were 
more informal than those of the regular courts, with which bar members 
were more comfortable. Moreover, many administrative lawyers of the 
day believed that the combination of executive, legislative, and judicial 
functions in a single agency could lead to autocracy or Marxism, and 
perhaps even to dictatorships like those emerging at the time in Europe.7
Over a period of several years, the ABA Special Committee drafted a 
series of bills to regulate the administrative process and found sympathetic 
legislators who were willing to introduce them into Congress. The most 
important of these proposals came to be known as the Walter-Logan bill. It 
provided for public hearings in rulemaking proceedings, for trial-type 
hearings conducted by appeal boards within the agencies themselves, and 
for broadly available judicial review.8 Members of the opposition 
Republican Party in Congress supported the bill, and so did conservative 
members of the President’s own party, the Democrats. On the other hand, 
the President strenuously opposed the bill, as did those Democratic 
legislators who were devoted to New Deal programs. Ultimately, the bill 
did pass in Congress in 1940, but President Roosevelt exercised his veto to 
disapprove the bill. The House of Representatives was unwilling to defy 
the President, who had just been re-elected. Supporters of the bill could 
 6. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 
300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 7. See Shepherd, supra note 5, at 1591–93; G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
NEW DEAL 116–27 (2000) (emphasizing constitutional objections). 
 8. Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 
258, 271–72 (1978). 
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not muster the two-thirds vote needed to override Roosevelt’s veto. Thus, 
the Walter-Logan bill did not become law. 
After this defeat, the ABA decided to scale back its objectives. It 
replaced the very conservative members of its Special Committee with 
more moderate lawyers, and it began to seek a compromise.9 For example, 
the ABA became less insistent on expanding judicial review of agency 
actions, in part because the courts were increasingly dominated by liberal 
judges appointed by Roosevelt.10 Meanwhile, the administration came to 
understand that the public saw a need for and expected some reforms. 
When Roosevelt died, the new President, Harry S. Truman, was even more 
amenable to reform legislation.11
In a new spirit of cooperation, the ABA Special Committee submitted a 
revised draft bill. The bill became the basis for extensive negotiations 
involving the Special Committee, congressional leaders, and lawyers from 
the Department of Justice. These discussions led directly, after much 
maneuvering, to the final text of the APA. The bill spelled out in detail the 
features of an administrative hearing in order to ensure minimal procedural 
protection for regulated interests. But the bill also accommodated 
government concerns, because it provided that any given agency must 
comply with these requirements only if its enabling statute required it to 
grant the APA hearing. For many rulemaking proceedings, only a simple 
“notice and comment” procedure would be required.12 The bill recognized 
a general principle that agency action should be subject to judicial review, 
but the negotiators chose to leave an ambiguity as to the extent, if any, to 
which the bill went beyond existing judicial review principles. 
Ultimately, Congress enacted the APA by a unanimous vote, although 
historians tell us that not many of the participants in this protracted 
struggle were very enthusiastic about the final product.13 Progressives 
were wary of its burdens but supported it anyway, because the 
administration and agencies had indicated that they could live with the 
bill’s modest requirements. Conservatives were disappointed at not having 
achieved more, but they reluctantly supported the APA because they had 
come to believe that a moderate bill was the most they could attain at that 
time. 
 9. Shepherd, supra note 5, at 1645–47. 
 10. Id. at 1644. 
 11. Id. at 1641–43, 1647–48, 1658–59. 
 12. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)–(d) (2000). 
 13. Shepherd, supra note 5, at 1678–81. 
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THE ERA OF CONSOLIDATION 
The enactment of the APA led directly to what I call the Era of 
Consolidation. This was a period of great stability. For more than two 
decades, Congress showed very little interest in revisiting the core 
provisions of the Act that it had taken so long to adopt. 
I do not mean to suggest that no one tried to reopen the debate. On the 
contrary, the ABA remained actively engaged in doing exactly that. In 
1946 the ABA reorganized the Special Committee and gave it a new 
name—the Section of Administrative Law. Leaders of the Section 
believed that the Administrative Procedure Act had not gone far enough. 
In 1956, a committee of the Section proposed that the APA should be 
repealed and replaced by what the committee called a Code of Federal 
Administrative Procedure.14 The changes contemplated by this Code 
would have been dramatic. Under its provisions, more regulations would 
have been issued through formal hearings, adjudicative hearings would 
have been conducted using the same rules of evidence as are used in the 
courts, and all agency actions would have become reviewable in court 
unless a statute prescribed otherwise.15 In short, the ABA’s reform agenda 
at this time was similar, at least in its general thrust, to some of the 
measures that the ABA had unsuccessfully sought during the struggles 
over the original APA. 
A bill that incorporated the principles of the Code was introduced in 
Congress in 1959.16 The federal administrative agencies, however, had not 
participated in the drafting of this bill, and they vigorously objected to it.17 
The bill made no progress in the legislature. Congressional supporters later 
rewrote the bill as a set of proposed amendments to the APA. The revised 
version passed one House of Congress in 1966 but advanced no further. 
Finally, the ABA decided that the Code proposal was politically 
infeasible and abandoned it. After further deliberation, the association 
endorsed, in 1970, a less ambitious package of twelve recommendations 
for amendments to the APA.18 Yet even this modest package achieved 
little success. Only one of the twelve recommendations was ever 
 14. The following account is based primarily on Cornelius B. Kennedy, Foreword: A Personal 
Perspective, 24 ADMIN. L. REV. 371, 372–81 (1972). 
 15. 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.04 at 32 (1st ed. 1958). 
 16. S. 1070, 86th Cong. (1959), reprinted in Landmarks Along the Way, 24 ADMIN. L. REV. 412 
(1972). 
 17. 1 DAVIS, supra note 15, at 26. 
 18. The 12 ABA Recommendations for Improved Procedures for Federal Agencies, 24 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 389 (1972). 
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enacted—a prohibition on off-the-record meetings between agency 
decisionmakers and private persons who have an interest in a proceeding.19
Why were these ABA initiatives so unsuccessful? Observers in the 
United States have offered a variety of reasons.20 The opposition of the 
bureaucracy was certainly one contributing factor. In addition, some 
believe that the issues involved were obscure and did not hold much 
inherent interest for politicians, compared with other items on their 
legislative agenda. I would also suggest that, in hindsight, there was little 
need for reforms of the kind that the ABA favored. The essence of those 
reforms was to make formal administrative proceedings look more like 
judicial proceedings, and over time that prescription has come to seem 
more and more obsolete. The judgment of history has been that the 1946 
APA reached a basically sound reconciliation of competing considerations 
on those issues, and the reformers were not able to demonstrate a very 
urgent need to improve on that compromise. 
THE ERA OF ADAPTATION 
Meanwhile, the underlying realities of administrative law practice were 
changing. For example, new substantive legislation was being passed. 
New agencies were created to enable government to protect consumers 
from dangers to their health, their safety, and their pocketbooks. To 
implement these new responsibilities, agencies turned increasingly to 
rulemaking.21 Adjudicative decisionmaking, which had received so much 
attention from the ABA’s reformers, was losing its prominence. 
The question on many minds was whether these and other new realities 
of administrative law called for new legislation—laws that would take 
account of developments that the drafters of the 1946 statute had not 
foreseen. In a number of cases, administrative lawyers reached a 
consensus in favor of change, and the result was the enactment of reform 
statutes to update and supplement the APA. This was the defining theme 
of the third era, the Era of Adaptation. 
To be candid, however, I must admit that my effort to divide the 
modern history of statutory reform into four discrete periods does not 
work very well in this instance. It would be more accurate to say that the 
 19. Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 4(a), 90 Stat. 1246 (1976) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (2000)). 
 20. See, e.g., William H. Allen, The Durability of the Administrative Procedure Act, 72 VA. L. 
REV. 235, 242–47 (1986). 
 21. Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking’s Promise: Administrative Law and Legal Culture in the 
1960s and 1970s, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1139, 1147–48 (2001). 
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second and third periods overlapped. The decade of the 1960s should be 
seen as both the tail end of the Era of Consolidation and the beginning of 
the Era of Adaptation. 
Beginning during this period, the ABA did not have to serve as the 
only prominent forum for dialogue and consensus-building among lawyers 
about administrative law reform. In 1964, after experience with a series of 
temporary entities, Congress created a new long-term institution within the 
government to address these issues—the Administrative Conference of the 
United States (ACUS). The Conference was, in fact, a partnership between 
the government and the private sector. Its 75 to 100 members were drawn 
primarily from the agencies, but practitioners and academics were well 
represented. ACUS made periodic recommendations to Congress, the 
courts, and the agencies themselves about ways to improve the 
administrative process. It also maintained a small permanent staff to 
support its advisory and coordinating functions.  
Let me give you several examples of the reform laws that Congress 
passed during this period, with the ABA and ACUS serving as voices for 
the administrative law community. In 1966, Congress enacted the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).22 This law was a complete overhaul 
of section 3 of the original APA, the public information section. Although 
section 3 nominally provided for publication of agency rules, policy 
statements, and other important government documents, studies by the 
ABA and others demonstrated that it had not been effective.23 The new 
law clarified this requirement and added new sanctions for noncompliance. 
More importantly, FOIA provided that any government document that the 
agency was not required to publish on its own must nevertheless be 
released to “any person” on request, unless the document fell within any of 
nine exemptions spelled out in the Act.24 Furthermore, if the government 
did not comply with such a request, the requester would be entitled to file 
suit in a federal court, and the government would have the burden of 
justifying its failure to disclose the information. 
FOIA was adopted primarily as a result of the advocacy of a 
congressional subcommittee chairman, aided by strong support from news 
organizations, which expected to benefit from the reform.25 The executive 
branch was not enthusiastic about the extra work that the new law was 
 22. Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000)). 
 23. See 1 JAMES T. O’REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE § 2.2 at 8 (3d ed. 2000). 
 24. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2000). 
 25. See HERBERT N. FOERSTEL, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW: THE 
ORIGINS AND APPLICATIONS OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 39–42 (1999). 
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expected to create, not to mention the greater accountability that is 
inherent in a disclosure statute. The government managed to get some of 
the exemption provisions clarified to meet its needs, but it did not openly 
oppose enactment of the bill. In fact, government compliance with the Act 
has proven to be much more expensive than most of its supporters 
realized.26 Disagreements about the scope of the exemptions have also 
generated much litigation, as well as occasional corrective amendments by 
Congress. Undoubtedly, however, the broad availability of information 
that FOIA has brought about has had an important and beneficial impact 
on the openness of government operations. 
A similar piece of legislation was the Government in the Sunshine 
Act,27 adopted in 1976. It complemented FOIA by establishing a general 
requirement that administrative bodies (other than bodies that are headed 
by a single administrator) must conduct their meetings in open session. 
The Act contains a series of exemptions like those found in FOIA.28
The organizations of administrative lawyers did not play a prominent 
role in the enactment of the statutes that I have just mentioned, but they 
did take the lead in advocating another statute that Congress adopted in 
1976. This law brought about a partial abolition of the ancient doctrine of 
sovereign immunity.29 This doctrine, which the United States had inherited 
from early English law, asserted that the government may not be sued 
without its consent. The doctrine had never been applied literally, but 
some cases did enforce it. The results of those cases seemed unjust to 
many observers. Moreover, cases in which courts decided whether the 
government had consented to suit in particular situations were 
unpredictable and poorly reasoned. 
The ABA and ACUS, working in partnership, each issued 
recommendations advocating legislative abolition of sovereign 
immunity.30 Congress adopted almost the exact language that the two 
organizations had proposed. One reason for the success of the reform is 
that the Department of Justice also endorsed it. At the time, the Justice 
Department was represented on this issue by an assistant attorney general, 
Antonin Scalia, who is now a distinguished Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court. Justice Scalia had earlier served as the chairman of ACUS 
 26. Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes, REGULATION, March/April 
1982, at 15. 
 27. Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 3(a), 90 Stat. 1241 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2000)). 
 28. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c) (2000). 
 29. Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 1, 90 Stat. 2721 (codified in relevant part at 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 703 
(2000)). 
 30. 95 ABA ANN. REP. 342 (1970); ACUS Recommendation 69-1, 1 A.C.U.S. 23 (1969). 
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and had also written about sovereign immunity issues as a law professor. 
Another factor that helped to secure the government’s support was that the 
bill was carefully limited in its scope. For example, it applied only to 
lawsuits in which the plaintiff sought to force the government to cease 
unlawful conduct for the future. Suits for money damages were excluded 
from the legislation. (There are, however, other statutes that grant the 
government’s consent to be sued for damages in some, but not all, 
circumstances.) 
At the same time, Congress enacted another judicial review reform bill 
that had been proposed by ACUS.31 This measure allowed a plaintiff to 
bring suit against the United States without having to allege that the value 
of the matter in controversy exceeded a specific minimum dollar amount, 
as had previously been required in many circumstances. 
THE ERA OF DISILLUSIONMENT 
The 1978–82 Regulatory Reform Bill 
As the 1970s drew to a close, it appeared likely that this series of 
legislative developments would culminate in a major “regulatory reform” 
bill that would make significant revisions in the APA. The slogan 
“regulatory reform” had become popular with politicians of both parties. A 
bill pending in Congress would have prescribed a variety of changes in the 
APA.32 Some provisions would simply have codified practices that had 
already become common, such as the practice of incorporating all 
materials pertaining to a given rulemaking proceeding into an organized 
“rulemaking file.” A limited set of procedures for holding hearings on 
important contested issues in rulemaking would also have been codified. 
Furthermore, various exemptions from rulemaking procedure would have 
been repealed, as recommended by the Administrative Conference. 
Although the ABA had not originated the bill, it cooperated in this 
congressional initiative. Representatives of the Administrative Law 
Section spent much time commenting on the bill’s proposals and 
suggesting additional language. 
The regulatory reform drive of 1978–82 did not succeed, however, and 
I would like to note some of the reasons why it did not. At that time, many 
citizens and their elected representatives were becoming highly 
 31. Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 2, 90 Stat. 2721 (1976) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000); 
ACUS Recommendation 68-7, 1 A.C.U.S. 22 (1968). 
 32. See S. 262, 96th Cong. (1979), summarized in S. REP. 96-1018, 96th Cong. (1980). 
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disenchanted with government. This development was best symbolized by 
the election of Ronald Reagan to the presidency in 1980, as the candidate 
of the Republican Party. One of the main themes of President Reagan’s 
campaign was a pledge to “get the government off the backs of the 
American people.” Not only was his anti-regulatory message a symptom 
of broad dissatisfaction with administrative agencies, but his electoral 
victory also gave further impetus to that sentiment by bringing into the 
government many officials who shared his philosophy. Party control of the 
Senate shifted from the Democrats to the Republicans. As a result of this 
shift in attitudes toward government, among both the public and its 
representatives, what I call in this paper the Era of Disillusionment was 
under way. 
Against this background, I can summarize briefly what happened to the 
regulatory reform movement. It had begun as a vehicle for relatively 
modest reforms. Among its sponsors were progressives who were largely 
comfortable with traditional regulatory methods, although interested in 
pushing the system somewhat in the direction of deregulation. Over time, 
however, the legislative package changed, as proponents of regulatory 
reform added more drastic provisions to it—provisions driven by the anti-
government ideology that had come into vogue. For example, some of the 
bills specified that the Office of Management and Budget, an arm of the 
White House, must closely supervise the agencies in their preparation of 
cost-benefit analyses, and that a congressional committee should be able to 
delay the effective date of a new rule if the committee wanted to give the 
full Congress an opportunity to nullify the rule.33
Individually, these provisions might not have triggered much 
resistance. In their totality, however, they were perceived by Democrats, 
and their supporters, as much too hostile to regulation. Thus, in the end, 
although the leading bill had majority support in both the Senate and the 
House of Representatives, Democratic leaders in the House resorted to 
procedural maneuvers during the closing weeks of 1982 to prevent it from 
passing.34 This sequence of events is a good example of the situation I 
mentioned at the beginning of my talk: a reform movement that failed 
because it was too ambitious. 
Another noteworthy aspect of the regulatory reform drive of 1978–82 
is that administrative lawyers were not at the forefront of it. They did play 
a role, but support for the measure came primarily from business groups 
 33. H.R. 746, 97th Cong. (1981), summarized in H.R. REP. 97-435, 97th Cong. (1982). 
 34. Prospects for Regulatory Reform Legislation, AD. L. NEWS, Summer 1983, at 3. 
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that were complaining loudly about “overregulation.” (Of course, these 
groups typically spoke through lawyers who represented that specific 
constituency.) These groups were especially upset about what they 
regarded as costly and burdensome regulations issued by agencies such as 
the Environmental Protection Agency and the Occupational Safety and 
Health Agency. 
This feature of the reform movement was the subject of an interesting 
essay written in 1981 by the future Justice Scalia, who at the time was a 
professor and was also the Chairman of the ABA Administrative Law 
Section.35 He observed that, whereas the original APA was “preeminently 
lawyers’ legislation,” the impetus behind the current movement was “more 
commercial or economic.” He did not find this development altogether 
reassuring. As he wrote, “[t]he interest of the laity in administrative 
process, which now seems so flattering, may prove to be a bane.”36
One additional provision of the bill reflected very active involvement 
of the ABA, although in a most ironic way. I will explain the 
circumstances in detail, because they grew out of my own first project for 
the ABA. Senator Dale Bumpers, from the state of Arkansas, had offered 
an amendment to the APA to reduce drastically the degree of deference 
that courts display toward administrative agencies during judicial review. 
In 1979, as a young attorney in a law firm, I wrote a report for the 
Administrative Law Section criticizing the Bumpers Amendment.37 The 
governing Council of the Section unanimously endorsed a resolution 
opposing the amendment and forwarded it to the ABA House of 
Delegates. But the House adopted an exactly contrary resolution—one that 
favored the Bumpers Amendment.38 Obviously, anti-regulatory sentiment 
was strong in the ABA at that time. The bar’s endorsement gave impetus 
to the amendment, which then was incorporated into the various regulatory 
reform bills pending in Congress. 
Although the leaders of the Administrative Law Section were not 
enthusiastic about these developments, the vote of the House of Delegates 
meant that they were obliged to support the Bumpers Amendment. 
Therefore, they worked cooperatively with congressional leaders to revise 
the amendment into less radical form. Although these consultations did 
 35. Antonin Scalia, Chairman’s Message, 33 ADMIN. L. REV. v (1982). 
 36. Id. at x. 
 37. David R. Woodward & Ronald M. Levin, In Defense of Deference: Judicial Review of 
Agency Action, 31 ADMIN. L. REV. 329 (1979). 
 38. See Ronald M. Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in Administrative Law, 74 GEO. L.J. 1, 6 
& n.29 (1985). 
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result in some improvements to the text of the amendment, the 
administration, ACUS, and many congressional Democrats were strongly 
opposed to the Bumpers Amendment, and this opposition contributed to 
the collapse of the legislative package. 
The 1995 Regulatory Reform Bill 
Over the next dozen years, ideological conflict over regulatory policy 
continued, but the issue of revision of the APA was not actively pursued. 
That issue came back to life, however, in 1995, just after the Republicans 
regained control of Congress in the 1994 elections. The new congressional 
leaders were committed to a platform of sharply reducing the scope of 
federal regulation. After quickly pushing through a few minor measures 
reflecting that goal, they turned to an ambitious bill to amend the APA 
extensively. It was to be called the Comprehensive Regulatory Reform 
Act.39
Had it been enacted, the Act would have brought about a considerable 
departure from the purely procedural nature of the current APA. It would 
have inserted provisions that were openly designed to promote substantive 
goals.40 For example, the bill would have required that, when an agency 
wanted to issue a “major” rule, it would have to give specific 
consideration to alternative approaches such as “performance-based 
standards” and “market-based mechanisms.” Furthermore, the agency 
would have been required to select the “least cost alternative” approach to 
achieving statutory goals. The bill also set forth detailed criteria for 
conducting cost-benefit analyses and risk assessments, and it made the 
agency’s compliance with these criteria judicially reviewable, which is not 
the practice now. 
To a large extent, therefore, the controversy over this legislative 
proposal became a focal point for one of the major ideological divisions of 
the time. That observation is borne out by the identities of some of the 
prominent leaders who played active roles in the legislative debate. One 
principal sponsor of the bill was Senator Robert Dole, the Senate majority 
leader. In the following year, 1996, he became the Republican Party’s 
nominee for the U.S. presidency. On the other hand, one spokesman for 
 39. S. 343, 104th Cong. (1995). 
 40. Ronald M. Levin, Administrative Procedure Legislation in 1946 and 1996: Should We Be 
Jubilant at This Jubilee?, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 55, 57–59 (1996). 
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the opponents of the bill was Senator John Kerry, who later became the 
Democratic Party’s nominee in the 2004 presidential election.41
Ultimately, history repeated itself. The 1995 bill met the same fate as 
the 1978–82 proposals on regulatory reform. Environmental groups and 
other citizen groups that favored strong regulation lobbied forcefully 
against the proposed legislation. Legislative opponents, mostly Democrats, 
used the Senate’s parliamentary rules to prevent the bill from becoming 
law, even though the Democrats were the minority party at the time.42 
Once again, an administrative reform bill with strong ideological 
overtones led to polarization and finally to stalemate. 
Another way in which the 1995 controversy resembled the previous 
regulatory reform effort is that the pressure to pass the reform bill came 
primarily from the business community, a key Republican constituency, 
rather than from the organized bar.43 Indeed, the voice of the ABA was 
rather indistinct in this debate, largely because of the association’s own 
internal divisions. The Administrative Law Section had reservations about 
many provisions of the bill, but some members of the Section of Business 
Law were strong supporters of the legislation. The ABA’s ambivalence 
tended to make it a less forceful presence in this controversy than it had 
been in some past reform controversies. 
The prominence of business interests in promoting legislation on 
administrative law has continued to the present day. A recent example is 
the Information Quality Act, adopted in 2000, which allows private 
interests to petition an agency to obtain correction of information that the 
agency has disseminated.44 The Act came about because an industry 
lobbyist induced a friendly legislator to insert its language into a lengthy 
spending bill.45 Almost no one knew the provision was there, and it 
became law with no real scrutiny by agencies or the public. The long term 
lesson is that, in the United States, administrative lawyers will probably 
continue to have to share the reform stage with economic interest groups 
that have much greater political influence in Congress. As Justice Scalia 
 41. See MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour: Changing the Rules (PBS television broadcast July 17, 1995) 
(transcript available at LEXIS, News Library, Newshr File). 
 42. Bob Benenson, Procedural Overhaul Fails After Three Tough Votes, 53 CONG. Q. 2159 
(1995). 
 43. Levin, supra note 40, at 57. 
 44. Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000). 
 45. Rick Weiss, “Data Quality” Law is Nemesis of Regulation, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 2004, at 
A1. 
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said in the essay I mentioned, these groups believe that sometimes “the 
politically simplest way to alter substance is to alter process.”46
Getting back to 1995, one of the most distressing legislative moves of 
that year, from the standpoint of the administrative law community, was 
Congress’s decision to terminate the Administrative Conference of the 
United States. Several factors contributed to this regrettable decision.47 
The new Congressional leadership wanted to show that it could “shrink the 
size of government” with the symbolic statement of eliminating at least a 
few agencies. Moreover, some ACUS recommendations had offended the 
organized associations of administrative law judges—the officers who 
conduct hearings in many agency adjudications. Some of the aggrieved 
members of these organizations had contacts in Congress and encouraged 
the trend toward elimination of the Conference. More fundamentally, the 
termination of ACUS was a sign of the apparent lack of importance that 
legislators ascribed to serious deliberations on administrative reform. 
However, this setback seems to have been only temporary. Recently, after 
the oral presentation of these remarks, Congress approved legislation to 
bring ACUS back to life,48 although it has not yet appropriated funds to 
pay for the revived agency. 
CONCLUSION 
I have painted a relatively bleak picture about legislative reform efforts 
during the past twenty years, and I do not want to overstate my argument. 
Even despite the trends that I have been describing, some statutory 
improvements have made their way through Congress—generally in 
specialized subject areas that are less likely to be ideologically charged or 
controversial. For example, Congress adopted by consensus a set of 
statutes to guide the use of negotiation and alternative dispute resolution in 
administrative proceedings.49 In effect, it has responded to some of the 
“collaborative governance” themes that Professor Freeman discusses in 
her presentation. In his commentary, Professor Lubbers has more to say 
about these laws and their implementation. Congress also has recently 
legislated to update the Freedom of Information Act in light of the new 
 46. Scalia, supra note 35, at x. 
 47. See Gary J. Edles, The Continuing Need for an Administrative Conference, 50 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 101, 127–32 (1998). 
 48. Federal Regulatory Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-401, 118 Stat. 2255 (2004). 
 49. Negotiated Rulemaking Act, Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4970 (1990) (codified at 5 
U.S.C. §§ 561 et seq. (2000)); Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 
2738 (1990) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 571 et seq. (1990)). 
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issues posed by electronic communications.50 I could cite several other 
examples as well. 
Moreover, the ABA Administrative Law Section continues to generate 
proposals for statutory reform. A current example is an elaborate proposal 
drafted by Professor Michael Asimow, my casebook co-author.51 It would 
amend the APA to extend certain hearing rights to adjudicative cases that 
are now heard by presiding officers who are not administrative law judges. 
It is less fraught with ideological overtones than the rulemaking initiatives 
that I was discussing earlier. Accordingly, we have hopes that it will make 
real progress, although it is too soon to know for sure. 
Despite these positive developments, the history that I have recounted 
tends to demonstrate a point that I made at the outset: statutory reform of 
administrative law in our system is a relatively rare event. Value conflicts 
and fears about policy consequences have often prevented legislative 
proposals from achieving success.  
And yet, as I said, administrative law has in fact been quite dynamic 
during the past few decades, thanks to changes instituted by courts, the 
President, and agencies themselves.52 A prominent example is the 
rulemaking process, which has undergone dramatic change without 
amendment of the controlling APA provision. One reason for the failure of 
the various bills that I have described is that much of what they sought has 
been achieved by other means. Executive orders issued by successive 
Presidents have prescribed cost-benefit principles that agencies routinely 
apply as they develop their most significant regulations.53 Agencies 
themselves, acting on their own initiative or with encouragement from the 
presidential administration, have strengthened their analytical capabilities. 
Some, for example, have created internal offices with expertise in 
economic or other technical disciplines. Most importantly, the courts have 
forced changes in the rulemaking process by intensifying the scrutiny they 
give to administrative rules. To survive judicial review of an important 
rule, an agency will have to give a careful explanation of the justifications 
for the rule, maintain a record that contains evidentiary support for the 
 50. Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231, 110 Stat. 
3048 (1996). See also E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899 (2002). 
 51. See Michael Asimow, The Spreading Umbrella: Extending the APA’s Adjudication 
Provisions to All Evidentiary Hearings Required by Statute, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1003 (2004). 
 52. See Alan B. Morrison, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Living and Responsive Law, 72 
VA. L. REV. 253 (1986). 
 53. See Exec. Order 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993), superseding Exec. Order 12,291, 46 
Fed. Reg. 13193 (1981). 
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factual premises of the rule, and respond to significant criticisms presented 
in the rulemaking comments.54
A second example is judicial review. During the latter half of the 
twentieth century, barriers to obtaining judicial review were substantially 
relaxed—primarily as a result of the courts’ own initiative.55 Prior to this 
period of transformation, a plaintiff usually lacked standing to challenge 
an agency action in court unless he could show that the government had 
infringed an interest that the underlying law directly protected. 
Furthermore, the validity of a rule could not be challenged until the 
government brought an enforcement action to implement it. These are 
principles that Japanese lawyers would find at least somewhat familiar. 
But they have been abandoned in the United States. Now a plaintiff who 
has actually been injured by a government action has standing if he can 
demonstrate merely that his interests are generally compatible with the 
purposes of the statute. And a citizen can often obtain judicial review of a 
regulation as soon as it is promulgated. Yet, during this entire period of 
transformation, the text of the APA remained unchanged (except in regard 
to sovereign immunity). The innovations occurred because the courts 
changed their interpretation of the APA language, stimulated by academic 
commentary. 
Indeed, some American scholars argue that statutory reform should be 
a last resort—a route to avoid except where absolutely necessary.56 They 
argue that a more decentralized approach to reform allows for differences 
in the solutions that will be adopted in various government programs. In 
other words, an agency should be able to take advantage of its particular 
experience and expertise in fitting procedures to its specific problem areas. 
Also, the argument runs, a nonstatutory approach permits experimentation. 
Procedures that do not work out as intended can be revised with less effort 
than would be needed if those procedures were required by statute. If we 
accept this line of argument, there is a strong case for a broadly phrased, 
open-ended administrative procedure act, which allows for evolution 
through nonstatutory means. 
I will close with a simple hypothesis for your consideration. Because of 
its different political structure, Japan is not likely to see its legislative and 
 54. See JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 317–28 (3d ed. 
1998) (summarizing principles for reviewing rules for abuse of discretion). 
 55. See Ronald M. Levin, The Administrative Law Legacy of Kenneth Culp Davis, 42 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 315, 338–43 (2005). 
 56. Craig N. Oren, Be Careful What You Wish For: Amending the Administrative Procedure Act, 
56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1141 (2004); Sidney A. Shapiro, A Delegation Theory of the APA, 10 ADMIN. L.J. 
AM. U. 89, 106–09 (1996). 
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executive branches come into conflict in a manner that would be directly 
comparable to what I have described in the United States. Nevertheless, 
my country’s experience may illustrate, in a dramatic and perhaps 
exaggerated form, some of the political hazards that could lie ahead as 
Japan pursues its own approaches to statutory reform of administrative 
law. 
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